News CENTRAL ASIA POLITICS

Will China displace Russia from the Central Asian region after the war in Ukraine?

What will be the future of the five “stans” after the war in Ukraine, and what will happen to their multi-vector foreign policy? Will Beijing be able to strengthen its influence in the region and push out Russia? This and more was discussed this week by Western media in publications about Central Asia. Central Asia […]

Will China displace Russia from the Central Asian region after the war in Ukraine? Photo: Internet

What will be the future of the five “stans” after the war in Ukraine, and what will happen to their multi-vector foreign policy? Will Beijing be able to strengthen its influence in the region and push out Russia? This and more was discussed this week by Western media in publications about Central Asia. Central Asia after the war in Ukraine: will multi-vectorism become a thing of the past?

The American magazine Diplomat has pondered the future of Central Asia after the end of Russia’s war against Ukraine. The author of the publication, Ahmad Tariq Nurzade, a diplomat with 17 years of experience in the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provides a forecast on how the region’s relations with external players will change.

The Russian invasion and its global consequences have led to geopolitical changes and economic weakening. In Central Asia, the perception of Russia as a country with significant influence has changed, opening up opportunities for other players, particularly China, writes Nurzade. Before the war, Russia was the main trading partner of the Central Asian countries, but now it is being replaced by China: in 2023, Beijing surpassed Russia in trade turnover with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

The author recalls that at the peak of the January events in Kazakhstan, even before the war in Ukraine, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev sought military assistance from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and many commentators concluded at that time that “Tokayev is now in debt to Putin.” However, after the war began, Kazakhstan rejected such opinions and stated that Astana does not recognize the Russia-backed separatist entities in eastern Ukraine. Kazakhstan’s neutral position has caused outrage among Russian deputies and pro-Kremlin propagandists. “Despite the tense rhetoric, Tokayev has managed to maintain generally stable relations between Moscow and Astana,” the author writes.

Uzbekistan maintains good relations with Russia but at the same time seeks to deepen ties with the West. Tashkent has neither condemned nor supported the war. Uzbekistan’s economy relies on remittances from several million Uzbek labor migrants working in Russia.

Russia has never been a major trading partner for Turkmenistan. Ashgabat, which has adhered to neutrality in foreign policy since 1995, maintains a cautious position during the war as well. China has long been Turkmenistan’s main economic partner.

Dushanbe is more dependent on Russia economically and in terms of security than any other country in the region. A Russian military base is located in Tajikistan. The Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan necessitates strengthening the partnership with Moscow. Since the beginning of the war, relations between the two countries have changed little.

The West has no economic interests in Kyrgyzstan, so Bishkek has not faced serious pressure. Kyrgyzstan is likely helping Russia circumvent sanctions more than its neighbors.

As the author writes, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there are fears in the region that if Moscow wins, it may turn its attention to them, potentially repeating a scenario similar to that in Ukraine. The anxiety is particularly acute in Kazakhstan, where a large Russian diaspora resides, notes Nurzade. “The risk in these countries is significantly higher than in Ukraine. Serious dissatisfaction among people with their dictatorial governments and the presence of terrorist and separatist groups are factors that heighten concerns in Central Asia if a war similar to that in Ukraine breaks out,” the article states.

A former diplomat believes that the multi-vector policy in the “stans” will remain in the past. “The region will inevitably have to unite either with the West or with a non-Western bloc, including China, Russia, Iran, and other countries. The choice between the West and Russia is a complex task for Central Asia. Politically, these countries do not know democracy, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press in the way these norms are presented by the West. Economically, they increasingly depend on the West for technology and investment, but remain closely tied to Russia. Post-Soviet republics with Russian model-based economic and military structures find it difficult to break free from Moscow’s influence. But it is possible,” the author summarizes.

Is China pushing Russia out of Central Asia?

In another article, the magazine Diplomat reports that China is increasing its influence in Central Asia and pushing Russia out. The author of the publication, Rakshit Shetty, an expert at the Indo-Pacific Research Program of the Takshashila Institute in India, writes that the recent state visit of Chinese leader Xi Jinping to Kazakhstan and his participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit demonstrated changes in the geopolitics of Central Asia. The Astana Declaration and documents in the areas of energy, security, trade, finance, and information security adopted at the SCO summit show that China’s influence is growing while Russia’s influence is weakening, the researcher believes.

With each solar panel and wind power plant that China installs, it not only engages Central Asian countries within its sphere of influence but also reduces their dependence on Russian gas. A day before Xi Jinping’s visit, Chinese state media reported on the partnership between Beijing and Central Asia in the field of green energy. The article stated that the Chinese company Goldwind Sci & Tech Co installed wind power installations capable of generating 319 thousand kilowatts of energy in the region during the first quarter of this year.

Beijing, by drawing Central Asia into its sphere of influence, is weakening Russia’s influence, the author believes. He refers to a recent article by Sha Hua in the American newspaper Wall Street Journal, which states that Chinese cars Geely and BYD have displaced Russian Lada cars from the Uzbek market. China’s exports to Kyrgyzstan reached 20 billion dollars in 2023 (up from seven and a half billion in 2021), with a large portion of imported goods being re-exported to Russia. China’s share in Kazakhstan’s foreign trade reached 21.3 percent in 2023, with Beijing surpassing Moscow.

The economic influence of China is not limited to trade, the article notes. The “Belt and Road Initiative” has turned Kazakhstan into an infrastructure hub of Eurasia, connecting Europe and China. However, the strengthening of Beijing’s influence is hindered by competition from other players, such as the European Union, Gulf countries, as well as anti-Chinese sentiments among the region’s residents, the author is convinced.

Kazakh Service of RFE/RL

Related topics