From high domestic platforms and at international organizations, Dushanbe regularly criticized the Taliban, expressing its rejection of their government and loudly voicing serious concern about the need to “form an inclusive government with broad participation of Afghan political and ethnic forces,” primarily Afghan Tajiks.
Moreover, Rahmon repeatedly called on international organizations and countries around the world not to remain indifferent to the fate of Afghanistan, warning that the territory of the country could turn into a “breeding ground for international terrorism” and pose a serious threat to the security of the region and the entire world. In Rahmon’s opinion, what is happening in Afghanistan directly affects Tajikistan. He saw the Taliban movement as a serious danger, both as an armed force positioning itself as Islamist.
It should be noted that Dushanbe’s tough stance was not only a reaction to the Taliban’s rise to power in the neighboring country but also reflected the logic and internal policy of Rahmon’s government. The authorities of Tajikistan traditionally view any Islamic movements as a potential threat to the existing state order. This logic has fostered concerns that the success of the armed Islamist movement in the neighboring state could generate similar sentiments and ideas within the republic itself.
Therefore, Rahmon’s tough stance was not only aimed at an external audience but also conveyed a clear message within the country: any such movements and ideologies will be perceived as a serious threat, and the response to them will be harsh and uncompromising.
“Defender of the Tajiks of the World” and populist statements
Taking advantage of the favorable moment, Emomali Rahmon attempted to present himself as the “defender of the Tajiks of the world.” For this purpose, Tajikistan temporarily provided refuge on its territory to anti-Taliban forces, which were mainly represented by Afghan Tajiks, and effectively allowed them to freely engage in political activities against the Taliban movement.
In particular, an office of the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan, led by Ahmad Massoud — the son of Ahmad Shah Massoud and one of the most prominent anti-Taliban forces — has opened in Dushanbe. Tajikistan was one of the few countries that officially expressed support for the Afghan opposition.
It should be noted that the image of a “defender of the Tajiks of the world” has become a tool for Dushanbe to promote Rahmon’s own interests on the international stage. Against the backdrop of uncertainty in the international community regarding Afghanistan and the confusion of many countries in the face of a new reality, Rahmon sought to present Tajikistan as a key regional player capable of representing the interests of a significant group — the Tajiks of Afghanistan. In doing so, he hoped to attract the attention of global powers, including the USA, France, and India — countries traditionally hostile to the Taliban.
Indeed, these efforts yielded short-term results: by October 2021, Rahmon was invited to France, and in November of the same year — to the United States.
However, Rahmon’s plans were not destined to materialize. Tajikistan, despite loud statements, was unable to offer anything — neither real military support to Afghan Tajiks nor effective political leverage against the Taliban. Major powers quickly realized that Rahmon’s government’s capabilities in this direction were limited and shifted their attention elsewhere. As a result, Dushanbe’s ambitious plans to become a key regional player were soon forgotten.
Change of political course and the marginalization of the opposition
The loud title of “defender of the Tajiks of the world” for Emomali Rahmon also turned out to be short-lived. By 2022, Ahmad Massoud had moved to Europe. Although some well-known representatives of Afghan Tajiks remained in Dushanbe, their political activity was significantly restricted.
Experts linked the reasons for Ahmad Massoud’s departure from Dushanbe, on one hand, to the improvement of relations between Russia and the Taliban movement, and on the other hand, to a noticeable softening of the Tajik authorities’ position towards this movement.
As experts noted, Tajik authorities significantly limited the activities of the Afghan opposition on the territory of the country, resulting in its leadership being forced to leave Tajikistan.
At the same time, media reports emerged stating that the actions and statements of Afghan opposition members allegedly posed a “threat to the internal security of Tajikistan,” which the republic’s special services became aware of.
Conversely, a number of Afghan opposition publications reported that the reason for the ban on the activities of the Afghan opposition was the lack of sufficient activity from the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan. According to these reports, the front’s office in Dushanbe had effectively turned into a structure for “receiving financial assistance” and a kind of “guest house” for individuals whose families, wives, and children lived abroad.
Judging by everything, the insufficient activity of Ahmad Masud’s front could hardly have been the sole reason for his expulsion from Dushanbe, as this front did not have sufficient capabilities to conduct a struggle from the territory of Tajikistan. Armed confrontation with the Taliban from the territory of Tajikistan has practically never taken place.
The political activity conducted from abroad also did not yield any significant results. Although Ahmad Masud held meetings and talked with representatives of several major powers, including China and Russia, these negotiations did not bring noticeable outcomes.
At the same time, the Taliban movement managed to establish more successful contacts with all parties during this period, establishing political, economic, and diplomatic ties.
External factors also played a role, primarily changes in the foreign policy situation in Central Asia. Russia, as a key partner of Tajikistan in the security sphere, gradually softened its position and did not shy away from dialogue with the Taliban. At the same time, China began active negotiations with the Taliban movement, seeking to protect its interests in the Wakhan Corridor within the framework of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative. Under these conditions, Dushanbe’s position became isolated and increasingly distinct from the overall picture.
Under the pressure of the changing geopolitical situation in the region and the world, the authorities of Tajikistan were forced to soften their position towards the Taliban while simultaneously pushing out the activities of the Afghan opposition from the territory of the country.
In this context, it is noteworthy that despite the harsh rhetoric and accusations of turning Afghanistan into a “hotbed of global terrorism,” as early as the end of 2021, just three months after the Taliban came to power, the Tajik authorities signed an agreement with them for the supply of 1.5 billion kWh of electricity to Afghanistan for a total amount of 69 million US dollars.
Analyzing external signs, one can assume that at the initial stage—in late 2021 and early 2022—Tajikistan was building relations with the Taliban movement on the principle of “cold in politics, warm in economics.” In other words, at the political level, the parties maintained mutual hostility and confrontation, while economic ties not only continued but also tended to develop.
However, over time, economic factors seemingly became one of the key reasons for the change in Dushanbe’s rhetoric. Afghanistan is one of the main and strategically important markets for Tajikistan’s electricity. Even during Ashraf Ghani’s rule, the republic supplied about 1.2–1.3 billion kWh of electricity to Afghanistan annually. Emomali Rahmon was not interested in losing this key buyer, who, moreover, purchased Tajik electricity at the highest price.
In the following years, the total volume of electricity exports abroad steadily increased; however, the authorities preferred not to disclose detailed statistics and did not report how much was supplied to Afghanistan. It can be assumed that the growth in electricity exports was primarily due to increased supplies to Afghanistan, which explains the secrecy surrounding the relevant statistics.
Border Clashes
In addition to political tension, armed clashes have repeatedly occurred along the common border of the two countries, resulting in casualties and injuries on both sides.
The main causes of these incidents can be conditionally divided into several categories.
1. Clashes with Drug Couriers.
These refer to armed incidents between Tajik law enforcement agencies and Afghan couriers involved in drug smuggling. Over the past four years, such clashes have occurred quite frequently. In the first half of 2025 alone, more than ten armed confrontations with drug couriers were recorded. This reason for clashes is the most common.
2. Clashes with Taliban Forces.
In August and October of this year, several clashes occurred in the Afghan province of Badakhshan, along the border section with the Shamsiddin Shohina district of Tajikistan, between Tajik border guards and Taliban militants. As a result of these clashes, there were fatalities and injuries.
According to Afghan media, the conflict was caused by changes in the course of the Amu Darya River due to gold mining operations conducted by Chinese and Afghan companies, as well as attempts by Tajik border guards to obstruct these operations. The Tajik side did not provide official comments on this incident.
3. Clashes with Tajik Militants Based in Afghanistan
In 2023, media repeatedly reported on the infiltration of armed individuals from the republic, based in Afghanistan, into Tajikistan. In several cases, armed clashes occurred between them and Tajik law enforcement agencies. At least in two separate episodes, five militants were killed. According to Tajik authorities, all of them were members of the banned group “Jamaat Ansarullah.”
4. Clashes or Attacks by Unidentified Individuals
In November of last year, and again in November of this year, at least three attacks were carried out from Afghan territory into Tajikistan, resulting in the deaths of about ten people and several injuries. Notably, all the deceased were Chinese citizens working in gold mining companies in Tajikistan. Of at least five injured, only one was a Tajik citizen; the others were also Chinese citizens.
Neither the authorities of Tajikistan nor representatives of the Taliban have provided official comments regarding these attacks. The identities of the attackers have not been established, and no extremist groups have claimed responsibility for the attack.
Experts suggest that both Tajik authorities and the Taliban likely have information about who is behind these attacks, but for some reason prefer not to disclose it.
Experts do not rule out that the mentioned attacks could have been carried out by one of the groups affiliated with the Taliban. If this is the case, it is quite likely that armed Uyghur formations are involved, as the attacks were directed exclusively against Chinese citizens.
There is also an alternative version that these incidents could have been organized by the Tajik authorities themselves to gain certain political advantages for Emomali Rahmon on the international stage, considering that Dushanbe continues to emphasize the ongoing threats to the country from the territory of Afghanistan.
It is also noteworthy that after the latest attack, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan accused the Taliban of failing to ensure security, stating that Tajikistan is making consistent efforts “to ensure security,” while “criminal groups” from the territory of Afghanistan continue to destabilize the situation in border areas.
Deportation of Afghan migrants from Tajikistan
Despite the sharp deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan following the Taliban’s rise to power, Tajikistan has accepted very few Afghan refugees. On the contrary, the authorities of the republic have closed the borders and significantly restricted the entry of refugees into the country.
Since 2022, Tajik authorities have begun deporting citizens of Afghanistan. According to the UN and independent media, at least 85 Afghan citizens were expelled from the country in 2022. From October 2024 to July 2025, the authorities deported no fewer than 485 people, including 334 Afghan refugees and asylum seekers. From July to August 2025, more than a thousand people were forcibly returned to Afghanistan.
Officially, the authorities of Tajikistan have acknowledged the deportation of thousands of Afghan citizens, stating that some of them entered the country “illegally” or “grossly violated residency rules.” Others who were deported were accused of “propagating extremist movements,” using “forged documents,” and “drug trafficking.”
Afghan media, in turn, reported that among those deported were former employees of Afghan government structures, for whom returning home could pose a direct threat to their lives.
Experts believe that the deported Afghan migrants were neither smugglers, nor illegal immigrants, nor extremists. Most of them were presumably employees of the previous Afghan government and sought asylum in Tajikistan, fearing for their lives. However, experts suggest that the reason for the mass deportations could be a fundamental reassessment of the Tajik authorities’ policy towards the Taliban, as the Taliban had previously expressed dissatisfaction with the presence of Afghan opposition in Tajikistan.
There is also a theory that the mass expulsion of Afghan migrants could have been used as a tool to pressure the Taliban government, while the Tajik side pursued certain political or diplomatic interests.
Another theory, which is also close to reality, suggests that these deportations are linked to similar mass deportations of Afghan refugees from Pakistan and Iran. Over the past two years, more than four million Afghans have been deported from these countries, including over 1.5 million just in 2025.
The fate of Tajik militants, based in Afghanistan
There is also a theory that these deportations could be the result of agreements between the Tajik authorities and the Taliban movement. If such an agreement took place, the government of Emomali Rahmon might demand the Taliban to hand over Tajik citizens in exchange for the expulsion of the Afghan opposition. In the first place, the Tajik authorities would demand the handover of militants from “Jamaat Ansarullah” and other armed groups.
At the moment, there are no signs that the Taliban intend to hand over Tajik citizens to the Tajik authorities. On the contrary, the “Ansarullah” militants cooperate with the Taliban and even participate in patrolling part of the Tajik-Afghan border.
Apparently, the Taliban are not inclined to easily hand over their allies to the Tajik authorities. So far, representatives of the Taliban movement have not officially commented on this issue.
The state of diplomatic relations with the Taliban
The official establishment of diplomatic relations between Tajikistan and the Taliban movement has not yet been announced. Nevertheless, bilateral meetings and negotiations have been held in a discreet format since 2022.
In March 2023, a Taliban delegation visited Tajikistan and met with representatives of the country’s authorities. As a result of this meeting, the Afghan Consulate in Khorugh was placed under the management of the Taliban, and a representative of the movement became the curator of the diplomatic mission.
The Taliban characterized this event as a major diplomatic achievement. This event brought them one step closer to international recognition of their authority. At the same time, the Tajik authorities did not confirm or deny this information at that time.
From a political standpoint, the secrecy of Dushanbe appears illogical: typically, a decision on such a significant step is announced immediately. However, according to the logic of the Tajik government, the reason for the reluctance to officially recognize the Taliban may be the fear of public reaction, as at this time hundreds, possibly thousands, of people in the country have been imprisoned on charges of “collaboration with terrorist and extremist movements,” which would inevitably provoke public discontent. Official recognition of the Islamist movement of the neighboring state would be perceived as an acknowledgment of its own mistakes regarding internal Islamic parties and movements.
Another question is why the authorities of Tajikistan limited themselves to only handing over the consulate in Khorugh to the Taliban, while still refusing to transfer the management of the Afghan Embassy in Dushanbe.
It is likely that the opening of the consulate was a kind of compromise step by the Tajik authorities to maintain good economic relations, primarily in the field of electricity export.
There is also a version that the consulate was handed over to the Taliban due to its proximity to the Afghan border, which significantly simplified the work of the Tajik authorities, including the export and import of various goods, as well as the deportation of Afghan migrants. Perhaps this is why, in March 2023, five months after the transfer of the consulate, by the personal order of President Emomali Rahmon, a border market between Tajikistan and Afghanistan resumed operations in the border areas of Badakhshan.
Recently, bilateral visits by high-ranking representatives of Tajikistan and Afghanistan have also increased. Just this year, several Afghan delegations visited Dushanbe, and in response, Tajik delegations have traveled to Kabul.
The Tajik Embassy in Afghanistan has not formally ceased operations; however, there is almost no information about its activities in the media. It is unclear whether it is engaged in full-fledged diplomatic activities, including visa issuance. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan stated that Dushanbe has not stopped issuing visas to Afghan citizens, but clarified that this only applies to those who are outside Afghanistan or are students.
Tajikistan’s position regarding the Taliban has been inconsistent and changeable since 2021. Initially, Dushanbe took a hard anti-Taliban stance, positioning itself as a defender of the Afghan opposition and especially Afghan Tajiks. Over time, their tone softened, and economic and diplomatic ties between the parties became close. Today, only the names of those opposition figures previously supported by Dushanbe remain — they have virtually disappeared from the political scene.
In this context, the political and economic reality, as well as security issues, compel Rahmon’s government to establish relations with the Taliban. Apparently, this process will continue in this direction, and in the near future, the authorities of Tajikistan may officially recognize the Taliban movement.
