Portrait of a migrant: who supports the economy of Tajikistan?

Aluminum, cotton, and cheap labor are identified by Tajik economists as the three main export goods of the republic. Moreover, all three are exported abroad in their primary form, and labor, in this sense, is unfortunately no exception.

Statistics

Over the past twenty years, due to the influence of state propaganda, a false perception of labor migrants has formed in Russian society. Most Russians believe that all arrivals from Central Asian republics are Tajiks. But this is not true! The number of working residents of Tajikistan in Russia is one million 600 thousand people, while the total number of labor migrants in Russia exceeds seven million. In other words, Tajiks make up only 23 percent of the migrant share.

Portrait of the Average Migrant from Tajikistan

Those who go to Russia for work from Tajikistan are mainly the active working-age population – men aged 20 to 55 years. The average age of a Tajik migrant is 32 years. Almost half of the migrants come from cities, and only one-third from rural areas.

According to studies, the overwhelming majority of migrants from Tajikistan lack specific qualifications or have low professional qualifications. For this reason, almost half of them are employed in the construction sector, and about 20 percent work in trade. The most qualified are considered to be just over 10 percent of Tajik labor migrants.

Relations with Russians

As a rule, Tajik migrants live quite isolated and withdrawn in Russia. This is due, firstly, to the language barrier – only 35 percent of Tajik migrants have a sufficient level of Russian language proficiency, and secondly, to the biased attitude of the local population towards newcomers – migrants are often referred to as “churka,” “Jamshut,” and “khach.”

Migrants from Tajikistan also try not to get involved with Russian official bodies, especially the police. About one-third of them have had negative experiences interacting with them, and they cite the corruption of the Russian police as their main problem.

Money Transfers

Over the past five years, the total volume of money transfers from labor migrants to Tajikistan has exceeded 12 billion dollars.

For example, last year labor migrants sent home one billion 795 million dollars, which is almost a quarter of Tajikistan’s GDP.

The lion’s share of this money – over 80 percent – comes from Russia. According to the Russian Central Bank, the average size of a money transfer to Tajikistan is 150 dollars.

According to an analysis by the Research Institute of the National Bank of Tajikistan, about 70% of Tajik families live off the money transfers from labor migrants. In turn, migrant families spend almost 60 percent of the received money on essential goods, 10 percent on medical treatment, and about the same on children’s education.

Attempts to Deny the Contribution of Migrants to the Country’s Development

As you can see, the figures speak for themselves. However, the authorities of Tajikistan have employed various tricks to downplay the significance of migrants in the country’s economy. For example, they manipulate statistics. Thus, the authorities of Tajikistan convince the population that only 387 thousand citizens are currently working in Russia, while the real figure is four times higher – 1 million 600 thousand. This is how many citizens of Tajikistan went to Russia for work and officially registered a work patent in 2021.

In an attempt to diminish the role of migrants in the country’s survival, the government of Tajikistan decided to simply classify data on the volume of money transfers. The National Bank of the republic has not disclosed statistics on money inflows from labor migrants for several years now.

Protection of Migrants’ Rights

In Tajikistan, the Concept of State Migration Policy was adopted 22 years ago, but the authorities have made no efforts to implement it. In terms of employment for the country’s citizens, the republic heavily depends on Russia. Moscow has repeatedly used this factor as a tool to pressure official Dushanbe.

Tajik labor migrants are not protected by Russian legislation and are deprived of labor rights, while the authorities of Tajikistan do not dare to protect their rights when problems arise with their citizens in Russia.

Moreover, the law enforcement agencies of the republic openly fight against Tajik human rights defenders who have taken on the relevant obligations of the authorities. For example, over the past 15 years, the efforts of the Tajik embassy in Moscow have led to the closure of dozens of officially operating Tajik diasporas in Russia, and the republic’s special services pursue and abduct individual activists who defended the rights of Tajiks.

Migrants as a Source of Income

By the way, labor migrants are in a disadvantaged position not only in Russia but even in their homeland. For two decades, the family-clan regime of Emomali Rahmon has profited from migrants in various ways. For example, the airline Somon Air, owned by the president’s brother-in-law, sells tickets to Russia at inflated prices and does not allow Russian airlines to lower ticket prices for Tajiks.

Another example is foreign passports. An affiliated company owned by the president’s second daughter, Ozoda Rahmon, prints forms for foreign passports ranging from 75 to 225 dollars. For comparison, obtaining foreign passports in neighboring Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan costs about 25 dollars.

The third source of income for the presidential family from migrants is their money transfers. Private commercial banks, 90 percent of which are owned by relatives of Emomali Rahmon, convert rubles and dollars at a low exchange rate when issuing money transfers, earning tens of millions of dollars from this.